Many of the wars of the 21st century will be asymmetric conflicts. There are multiple definitions of this term, so I won’t try to define it in great detail. Suffice to say that asymmetric warfare is often practiced in order to nullify the advantage of a belligerent that is much stronger than another.
Let’s look at the Arab-Persian aggression against Israel in particular and analyze the form taken by one asymmetric conflict.
One feature of it – at least in its present stage – is that it is a proxy conflict. Israel is not fighting Iran, Saudi Arabia, or even Syria. Her direct antagonists are Hezbollah and Hamas. This permits the real enemy, in this case primarily Iran, to deny any connection to atrocities committed by its proxies, and to avoid international sanction while still pursuing an aggressive course. Proxy warfare is a common asymmetric technique; the Vietnamese war comes to mind in which the US fought soviet-backed Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, or the Soviet-Afghan conflict in which US-backed Mujahideen returned the favor.
Another feature is that it is primarily a low-intensity conflict. Much of the time fighting is confined to skirmishes between small units or terrorist attacks against the civilian population. The aggressor attempts to calibrate the damage done by his attacks so that the conflict will remain at a low enough level that its victim will not be able to justify using its superior forces. From time to time, for short periods, it may erupt into more conventional conflict. But the aggressor will try to keep these periods short to reduce the amount of damage that he will sustain from his more powerful adversary.
Finally, it is important to realize the degree to which this stage of the war is primarily a propaganda battle. The goals for the aggressors are not the traditional ones of destroying armies and conquering territory. The main goal is to change attitudes and opinions among various groups of people in order to manage the outcomes of the more intense flare-ups and to lay the groundwork for a successful conventional assault, when the time comes. There are several main groups that are targeted:
1)   The aggressor’s own population. Successful low-intensity warfare, combined with propaganda that vilifies the enemy, is an excellent tool to recruit personnel and funds for the cause.
2)   The world in general. Although the aggressors may not have the power to force the victim to give up territory directly, it may be possible to manipulate the major powers who do have the ability to change fundamental geopolitical realities. The government of South Africa, for example, which was much more powerful militarily than the ANC, was forced to cede control by international pressure. The Second Lebanon War, a conventional flare-up in the midst of low-intensity struggle between Israel and Hezbollah, ultimately resulted in a better strategic position for Hezbollah – despite the fact that Israel had the military advantage – because of Hezbollah’s management of world opinion.
3)   The victim’s population. The frustration of trying to fight a low-intensity conflict is highly damaging to the morale of a conventional army. The combination of terrorism with propaganda is also effective in causing a civilian population to doubt the rightness of its own nation’s cause, or in extreme cases to support the aggressor.
