Archive for the ‘General’ Category

Israel could attack Iran without US green light

Wednesday, December 3rd, 2008

The Jerusalem Post reports today that a “top Ministry of Defense official” said that Israel could attack Iran’s nuclear targets with or without coordination with the US.

Israeli officials have said it would be difficult, but not impossible, to launch a strike against Iran without receiving codes from the US Air Force, which controls Iraqi airspace. Israel also asked for the codes in 1991 during the First Gulf War, but the US refused.

And last week Maj-Gen. Ido Nehushtan, commander of the Israel Air Force said that Israel had the capability to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities:

Nehushtan told [Der Spiegel] that whether a military strike is eventually decided upon is a political question and not an issue of Israel’s military capabilities.

A strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities “is a political decision,” the IAF commander said, “but if I understand it correctly, all options are on the table… The Air Force is a very robust and flexible force. We are ready to do whatever is demanded of us.”

When asked by the paper whether the Israeli military was able to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, which are spread around the country and partly located underground, Nehushtan said, “Please understand that I do not want to get into details. I can only say this: It is not a technical or logistical question.”  — Jerusalem Post

I don’t doubt that there are such contingency plans, because Israel cannot afford not to have them. But the interesting question is this one:

Why are a “top MOD official” and a normally reticent general talking to the foreign and English-language Israeli media about them? And why now?

One could speculate that the intended target is the incoming Obama administration, whose Iran policy is developing right now. But I don’t think so. For one thing, it would be easy to communicate with it directly. For the other, we need to look at the developing Obama policy.

Steven Rosen (“Wishful Thinking and Iran” [highly recommended]) suggests that Obama will initially reject out of hand  a) the military option  (whether executed by the US or by Israel with US acquiescence), b) the option of trying to bring about regime change in Iran, and c) the option of accepting a nuclear-armed Iran. He believes that the most likely policy will be a an attempt to change Iranian behavior with a combination of diplomatic carrots and sticks.

But Rosen points to a long history of failed negotiations between the US and Iran since 1979 — including a surprising number of attempts at ‘engagement’ by the Bush administration — to argue that the likelihood of this approach being successful  is low. He believes that the Iranians will continue to temporize until the administration faces only two options: bomb Iran or accept it as a nuclear-armed nation.

There is little doubt that the US will not initiate an attack even at this point: the negatives are too great: our troops in the region could be placed at risk, the oil supply could be disrupted, there could be world-wide terrorist attacks, even in the heart of the US.  And in the final analysis, the short-term consequences for America of Iran’s nuclearization would not be catastrophic (and what politician thinks about the long term?). Iran understands this and therefore does not fear a US attack. So it continues on the nuclear path.

Israel, on the other hand, sees an Iranian bomb as an existential issue.  If Iran develops a bomb and there is a possibility that it will be used against Israel — and it would be almost impossible to defend against a low-trajectory missile fired from Hezbollastan — then Israel would have no other option than to preempt. Ehud Olmert can claim that such thoughts are “megalomania”, but even a bear fears a cornered bobcat, and for good reason.

But Iran believes that the US would not permit an Israeli attack. The Bush administration, and particularly Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary who will continue with Obama, have made it clear that they are strongly opposed to it. Iranian policymakers think that the US will never give Israel a green light.

But what if Israel didn’t need one?

Possibly the recent flurry of talk is intended to send a message to Iran that Israel a) can and b) will attack if it comes to that. And that maybe Iran would be better off accepting some of the large carrots that Obama will certainly be proferring instead of, essentially, making a committment to war.

Today Iran is seriously hurting due to the low price of oil. Those carrots are looking better all the time.

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Olmert still doing damage

Tuesday, December 2nd, 2008

In the summer of 2006, the second Lebanon war marked a turning point in the Mideast balance of power. By holding off the IDF, by showing that Israel was powerless to prevent massive disruption on her home front, by obtaining an advantageous settlement to the 33 day long war, Hezbollah struck a huge blow at Israel’s deterrent — both in image and reality, as the toothless UN resolution 1701 allowed Hezbollah to rearm far beyond its position at the start of the war. At the same time, Hezbollah’s effectiveness in manipulating the media — and Israel’s incompetence in that area — cast Israel as the villain, despite the fact that Hezbollah was the aggressor. ‘Disproportionate response’ was heard over and over as Hezbollah rockets continued to strike towns in northern Israel.

Whether by coincidence or due to the propaganda spin that characterized it, the war also marked a turning point in the American attitude toward Israel.  Initially the Bush administration — with the support of anti-Iranian elements in the Arab world — was prepared to allow Israel to finish off Hezbollah. After several weeks in which this did not happen, and during which Israel was continuously pilloried in the media, the administration’s patience wore out and Israel was instructed to accept the UN cease-fire.

American policy then made a 180-degree turn in the direction of the ‘realist’ position: the way to solve the problems of the Mideast is to force Israel to come to an agreement with the Palestinians, not to confront bad actors like Iran and Hezbollah (the Iraq Study Group report is an example). The Annapolis process began, aiming to bring about a Palestinian state. Israel was pressured to join a cease-fire with Hamas. And in November of 2007, a National Intelligence Estimate was issued that more or less sent the message that the US could live with  Iranian nuclear weapons.

I am not asserting that Israel’s failure in the 2006 war was the primary cause of the shift in American policy. But you can be sure that the advocates of the new policy — the policy that is certain to be adopted by the Obama administration — used it as an argument: “military force will be ineffective against Iran and her proxies; look what happened when the IDF, considered one of the best fighting forces in the world, went up against Hezbollah!”

There is plenty of blame to go around: for the inadequate preparation of the IDF, the strategic and tactical mistakes made, the lack of intelligence, the failure to follow a consistent plan, the inability to protect the home front, the lack of an effective media capability to counteract Hezbollah’s atrocity stories, the incredible blunder of ordering a large ground assault in the last two days of the war, etc. The IDF Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, resigned as a result of criticism. The completely incompetent Minister of Defense, Amir Peretz, was replaced by Ehud Barak, who at least knows to remove the lens caps from his binoculars.

However, the largest share of blame must go to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, both for the decisions he made (and didn’t make) and because as PM he bears the ultimate responsibility. Unfortunately, he somehow escaped punishment for one of Israel’s most serious failures and continued in office as PM.  Since then he has been credibly accused of multiple forms of corruption in office, and is now about to be indicted for one of them, billing several agencies for the same travel.

In other words, in addition to having failed at leading Israel in war and damaging her strategic position immensely, Olmert is most likely a common thief.

But that’s not all. It gets even worse.

While still hanging on to his position (a result of the dysfunctional parliamentary system that Israel is cursed with), and with a public approval rating in the single digits, he is making public policy pronouncements. Although he has no mandate to make concessions to the Palestinians, he  nevertheless is making statements that it will be hard for future governments to ignore.

He has called for “a withdrawal from nearly all, if not all, of the [occupied] territories”, including Jerusalem. and for returning the Golan heights to Syria, and has said there is a “short amount of time” in which to do this. He has called the idea that Israel is capable of  ‘doing something’ about the Iranian threat ‘megalomania’.

Anyone can take such positions. But anyone who does has to explain exactly how Israel can withdraw from “nearly all, if not all” of the territories today, while Hamas stands ready to take them over as it has in Gaza, and when there is no Palestinian leadership capable of making an enforceable peace. And he would have to explain why he thinks that Syria will choose to cut her fruitful ties with Iran and stop arming Hezbollah if Israel returns the Golan. Olmert doesn’t explain these things because they can’t be explained.

But when Olmert speaks — and his words are translated into English and printed in the NY Review of Books — then his words have significance. Indeed, they were quoted yesterday in the New York Times, by Roger Cohen (“Try Tough Love, Hillary“). They fit in well with Cohen’s argument that the new Secretary of State should continue the realist policy of her predecessor, and push, push, push until Israel finally gets out of the West Bank and Syria returns to the Golan:

Getting to such a two-state deal at, or close to, the 1967 borders will require concerted U.S. involvement from day one of the Obama administration. Its tone should be one of tough love, with the emphasis on tough.

“I am fiercely attached to Israel’s security”, Cohen says. Yet none of the 826 words of his op-ed are ‘Hamas’ or ‘Hezbollah’. ‘Iran’ appears  twice, thus:

Clinton noted during the campaign that the United States could “obliterate” Iran if it launched a nuclear attack on Israel. Olmert chose different language. He noted “a megalomania and a loss of proportion in the things said here about Iran.” Once again, his words are instructive.

Not a word about the tens of thousands of missiles aimed at Israel by Hezbollah and Syria, no mention that Hamas is developing similar capabilities as Hezbollah, all paid for by Iran. You’d think that someone “fiercely attached to Israel’s security” would think about these concrete threats, threats which would be hugely exacerbated by withdrawal from the West Bank or the Golan in the near future.

Voices like Cohen’s are popping up all over lately. The fundamental mistake they all make is that they assume that the conflict today is driven by the quarrel between Israel and the Palestinians.  It is not. Rather, it has been taken over by Iran to be used as a lever to wipe out Israel, by means of non-state proxies Hamas and Hezbollah and Iranian satellite, Syria.

A solution can’t come from pressuring Israel and paying off some Palestinians. The only way to begin to fix it is to go to the source, which is Iran.

But it’s hard for Americans to see this when they have Olmert’s foolish words to quote.

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What do you have to do to be called a terrorist?

Saturday, November 29th, 2008

After a three-day standoff with militants ended amid a fire Saturday at the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel, the removal of the bodies from the wrecked 105-year-old landmark began… 

On Wednesday night, when a married couple in their 70s went to their third-floor window to see what was happening after hearing gunfire, the attackers blazed away with assault rifles, killing them both. Shards of glass still hung in the panes on Saturday.

When several attackers seized a Jewish outreach center, Nariman House, on Wednesday, neighbors mistook the initial shots for firecrackers in celebration of India’s imminent cricket victory over England. But then two attackers stepped out on a balcony of Nariman House and opened fire on passers-by in an alley nearby. They killed a 22-year-old call center worker who was the sole financial supporter of his widowed mother.

When a tailor locked up his store for the night, half a block from the Taj Hotel, a gunman spotted him and killed him instantly, said Rony Dass, a cable television installer. “We still don’t know why they did this,” he said, mourning his lifelong friend. Somini Sangupta and Keith Bradsher, NY Times

What do you have to do to be called a terrorist?

This question comes to mind when the word ‘militant’  is used in almost all of the media accounts of the Mumbai attacks.

In addition to the usual targets of  Westerners and Jews, the gunmen murdered anyone available — old men and women, anybody they felt like shooting.

When terrorists detonate a bomb, they know they are going to kill indiscriminately, but they don’t usually look their victims in the eye. In many cases these terrorists carefully aimed at their victims, most of whom were ordinary Indians.

“One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”, Jeremy Bowen of the BBC famously said, no doubt having in mind Palestinian terrorists and thereby proving himself a moral idiot. I suppose his logic is that he would prefer not to offend anyone, no matter how ignorant that person may be.

But for whom are the Mumbai terrorists ‘freedom fighters’?

Is it necessary to call them ‘militants’ so as not to offend the homicidal sociopaths among The Times’ readership? How many of them could there be?

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The Saudi Initiative

Friday, November 28th, 2008

What’s so wrong with the ‘Saudi initiative’ (more correctly, the Arab League initiative)? Couldn’t issues like the ‘return’ of descendants of Arab refugees be negotiated into return to the Palestinian state and compensation? After all, it does represent a breakthrough in that for the first time the Saudis seem to be saying that under some circumstances they would recognize Israel.

Caroline Glick makes the problem clear, when she writes,

With his enthusiastic embrace of the so-called Saudi peace plan, Olmert is committing Israel to accepting the Arab narrative of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Saudi plan is predicated on the wholly mendacious claim that there has never been any Arab aggression against Israel – only Israeli aggression against Arabs and legitimate Arab resistance to Israel. With Olmert now giving his stamp of approval to the Saudi plan, he is denying the country its moral right to defend itself both militarily and diplomatically. [my emphasis]

Leaving Olmert aside (how wonderful if this were possible in more than rhetoric!),  her point is well taken. The text of the Arab League approved version of the initiative and the original Saudi version can be found here: “The Arab Peace Initiative“.

There are several reasons that Glick is correct. Consider the introduction and point 1 of the proposal:

Reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government [introduction]

[The Council of Arab States] requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well. [point 1, my emphasis]

In other words,  the Arab states have chosen the ‘strategic option’ of  seeking peace through (their interpretations of) relevant UN resolutions, but Israel has not and must ‘reconsider’. The implication is that the Arabs want peace and Israel does not.

The second point describes the concrete steps that Israel must take — indeed, as the proposal has been presented by the Arabs, must complete — before the Arabs will take action:

I- Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.  [note that this includes all of East Jerusalem — ed]

II- Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194. [This has always been interpreted by the Arabs to mean that all 4-5 million Arabs claiming refugee status have a right to choose between compensation or ‘returning’ to Israel proper — ed]

III- The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

And here is the third point:

Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following:

I- Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.

II- Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.

The third point begins with the word ‘Consequently’, and the Arabs have made it clear that it is to be understood in a temporal as well as a logical sense — “after the above Israeli actions and as a result of them”. Before discussing the content of the third point, let’s look at the implications of this.

One would expect in a compromise made between equals that steps would be taken by both sides simultaneously, or perhaps with each side making a concession in turn. This gives the impression that neither side is admitting that its present position is untenable, but rather that they are moving together in a cooperative fashion. It also has the practical effect of enabling either side to stop the process if it feels that the other is not living up to its commitments.

But the Arab initiative is exactly the opposite. Israel is required to make all the concessions before the Arab states must do anything. This is reasonable only if we understand the first part — in which Israel must “reconsider its policies” as follows: Israel admits that her policies were wrong and agrees to redress the injustices. Then, and only then, will the Arab states grant ‘peace’ (we’ll discuss what this might be later).

So what exactly is Israel asked to redress?

  • By full withdrawal with no adjustments or compromises, Israel admits that the 1967 war was a war of aggression by Israel against the Arabs.
  • By ‘return’ or compensation of  ‘refugees’ Israel accepts that the consequences of the 1948 war are her responsibility. Everyone agrees that if the ‘refugees’ were allowed into Israel it would be the end of the Jewish state. But it’s also true that accepting responsibility for the refugees by compensation — even if not one ‘returns’ — is an admission of guilt.

So Israel is expected to admit her guilt and sole responsibility for the conflict, and give up everything concrete — land, and possibly even her nation itself. As Glick points out, Arab war and terrorism against Israel are therefore excused because they constitute morally and legally (by the Arabs’ interpretations of UN resolutions) justified resistance against an aggressor.

Now let’s look at what Israel gets, assuming that there still is an Israel after the implementation of point 2.

The conflict will be ‘ended’ — there will be no more fighting. There will be ‘normal relations’. The Arabs will ‘provide security’ for all states in the region.

There is no mention of recognition, even less recognition as a Jewish state. Will Israel even have a role in ‘providing security’ for herself? This is a surrender, not a treaty between equals.

The Arab nations have lost every war they fought against Israel and have had the West save them from suffering the consequences of defeat time and again. Yet they try to dictate terms of surrender as though they had been victorious! What arrogance and chutzpah!

But some say that regardless of all this, Israel should take the proposal seriously, at least as a starting point for negotiations. After all, it is the first time the Arabs — in particular the Saudis –have admitted that under some conditions they will live at peace with Israel. This reminds me of a joke: a man proposes marriage to a woman, who responds “I’ll marry you when Hell freezes over!” So the man goes home and tells his mother, “she hasn’t accepted yet but we have a starting point for negotiations. There are some conditions under which she’ll marry me.”

The only form of this initiative that Israel should be prepared to  use as a basis of negotiations should be one turned upside down. Something like this:

Whereas the Arab nations recognize that the state of Israel is fully legitimate and entitled to define itself as a Jewish state for the Jewish people, they agree to end the conflict.

In return, insofar as the Arabs, Iranians and their proxies will prove that they have actually renounced war and terrorism, Israel will negotiate a two-state solution with the Palestinians — those who accept the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state.

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Olmert is really finished this time

Wednesday, November 26th, 2008

Israel’s attorney General, Menachem Mazuz, has informed Prime Minister Olmert that he will likely be indicted for systematically billing multiple agencies to pay for private trips abroad (Ha’aretz, AG plans to indict Olmert over double-billing affair). This would be the first time a sitting Israeli PM was indicted.

There is no law in Israel which demands that the PM resign if he is merely indicted for a serious crime (he would need to be convicted), although Olmert has said that he would step aside if indicted. If he does resign or declare himself incapacitated, the ‘designated acting PM’ is Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, and she would take the position of PM for up to 100 days. New elections are already scheduled for February.

Previously Olmert promised to quit after the Kadima primary in September, assuming that the winner could form a coalition. Livni won, but for various reasons — in particular because the Shas party escalated their demands for tribute — she was not able to do so. Olmert then chose to stay on. My guess is that Olmert is looking for a way to hang on even now, unless things get a lot worse. A spokesman said that “…in this case the prosecution is presenting a one-sided, incorrect version of the events that is destined to crack and collapse.”

Polls show that the coming election may be close, although the Likud party of Binyamin Netanyahu presently has the advantage. That could change, and there is also the possibility of a unity government. In any event, there’s no question that Tzipi Livni today would be much more effective as PM than Olmert, the lamest of ducks.

There have been suggestions that the Obama administration wants to get moving immediately after his inauguration on a far-reaching ‘peace’ plan. Olmert has already made inappropriate statements about what Israel should be prepared to accept in negotiations with the Palestinians, statements which will be construed as bottom lines when serious negotiations resume with the new administration.

Considerations of national interest as well as decency and self-respect demand that Olmert step down now.

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