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The forces that fed Mideast conflict in 1967 were primarily external. The local issues were reflections of the cold war between the Soviet bloc and the West. Now there is still fuel being poured on the fire from the new US-Russian conflict, but there are newer, internal pressures at work. Barry Rubin describes them.

Nationalists Versus Islamists: The Middle East’s Core Issue

By Barry Rubin

The Middle East is in a new era, very different from the politics and strategic situation we have been used to for so long.

For 55 years the region has lived under Arab nationalist dominance. Every Arab regime, except perhaps Sudan, is Arab nationalist, governed by that basic system and world view.

Of course, these regimes have governed badly, not keeping pledges to unite the Arab world, minimize Western influence, destroy Israel, or bring rapid social and economic progress. Still, they know how to stay in power.

Remember that the last real regime change from within an Arab state happened 37 years ago when Hafiz al-Asad seized power in Syria. Since then, surprisingly little has changed in Arab ideology, political structure, economic organization, or society.

It has also been 28 years since Iran’s Islamist revolution took power in 1979. Since then–though not solely because of that event–Islamism has been on the upsurge. Certainly, it also suffered setbacks, and almost three decades later Islamism had been unable to seize power anywhere, at least until Hamas’s recent triumph in Gaza.

What has happened now, however, is that radical Islamism has reached a critical mass. It now poses serious challenges to Arab nationalism as the leading opposition in every Arabic-speaking country. Islamism plays a key role in governing Iraq; Hamas defeated Fatah on the Palestinian front; and Hizballah is close to gaining at least equal power in Lebanon.

For years, probably decades, to come, the Middle East will be shaken by a titanic battle between Arab nationalism and Islamism for control. This struggle, and certainly not the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the central theme and underlying factor in every regional issue.

This is so for several reasons. One is that the Islamist cause is now promoted by an alliance including two regimes, Iran and Syria, as well as by Hamas and Hizballah, which both rule territory. Syria’s government, technically “secular” and ruled by a non-Muslim Alawite minority no less, behaves like an Islamist one, especially in its foreign policy, as to keep loyal its Sunni Muslim majority.

It is folly to think that this HISH alliance (Hamas-Iran-Syria-Hizballah) can be split. After all, the parties have common aims and ideologies, their cooperation is so mutually beneficial, and last but not least they think they are winning.

Historically, there were two barriers for Iran’s trying to become the Middle East’s leading power: the Persian-Arab and Shia-Sunni divides. How could Persian, Shia Iran appeal to Arabs who mostly were Sunni? The HISH alliance solves that problem. Three of the four members are Arab, and Hamas is Sunni as is the majority of Syrians. If one adds Iraq’s Sunni Arab insurgency that breakthrough becomes even clearer.

Nor does this exhaust the Islamist forces working today to seize state power throughout the region. Al-Qaida is a factor, mostly in Iraq–where it cooperates closely with Syria–and Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaida is far more a threat in terms of terrorism, however, than in a strategic sense. Since it has only one tactic, in comparison to other Islamists’ flexibility, al-Qaida is unlikely to take over any countries.

A third Islamist set of groups are Muslim Brotherhood movements. While Hamas arises from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, its Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian counterparts do not particularly like Iran or Shia Muslims. Still, they are also trying to transform Arab nationalist into Islamist states. Even if they use elections in pursuing this objective the goal remains the same.

To understand the region today all its issues have to be seen in the context of this nationalist-Islamist battle. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, it will greatly increase the power of HISH, the Arab regimes’ readiness to appease it, and the recruitment for Islamists of all types throughout the area.

In Lebanon, Hizballah, backed by Iran and Syria, seeks to control the government, or at least have veto power over its policies. In Iraq, Syrian-backed Sunni insurgents fight Shias among whom Iran has considerable influence. HISH hedges its bets but on both sides tries to turn Iraq into a client state. Among Palestinians, Hamas seeks full power over the movement by ensuring that war with Israel continues and by driving Fatah out of the West Bank.

On the other side, in theory, are all the Arab regimes except Syria plus Israel. In practice, though, these forces are far from united. Arab governments will try to cut their own deals or pursue their own interests. They may be privately happy if Israel defeats Hamas or Hizballah but they will scarcely provide any help or make peace.

A good example here is Saudi Arabia. The Saudis fight Iran but do so by giving money and recruits to the Iraqi insurgency or their ill-fated attempt to buy off Hamas by brokering a deal between that group and Fatah. Neither of these tactics has been very helpful. And the incompetence, corruption, and dictatorial nature of the Arab regimes–plus their Islamist-style extremist propaganda–all help foster more opposition.

Still, this does not at all mean the Islamists will win. No one should underestimate the Arab nationalist regimes, and there are huge problems with the Islamists’ strategy. What is vital, however, is to understand that past realities are now outmoded, and myths all-too-often dominant in media and academia are even more misleading.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs, and author of the recently published The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).

Technorati Tags: Mideast Conflict, Islamism, Arab Nationalism

The Jerusalem Post reports:

Syria has begun delivery of the first batch of anti-aircraft missile and gun range land-based Pantsyr-S1E defense systems (SA-22 E in NATO terminology), the Web site of Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported Saturday.

The SA-22 E, produced by KBP, a precision weaponry manufacturer based in Tula, Russia, is a combined surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon system. The versatile platform can be mounted either on a tracked or wheeled vehicle.

According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the recently developed SA-22 E will be dispatched to Syria even before its deployment in the Russian military.

This is exactly the kind of weapon that Syria shouldn’t have. Let’s look at the Iranian-Syrian strategy: Iran wishes to develop nuclear weapons unmolested. She hopes to deter Israel and the US from a preemptive strike at her facilities by threatening Israel with missile attacks — especially mobile short-range missiles, which are very difficult to counter — from her clients Syria and Hezbollah.

I believe that Israel’s leadership considers an actual Iranian nuclear capability an existential threat, and will take action once some red line is crossed. We don’t know when this will be, but it’s obvious that Iran and Syria think it will be soon and are rushing to prepare for it. I do not believe that the US administration has the political capital or will to launch an attack themselves, but they would probably support an Israeli one.

I doubt that the Russians would be especially happy with a nuclear Iran. However, it appears that a new global struggle for influence is developing between the US and Russia, and of course the Mideast is a major theater in that struggle. Israel represents a strong point for the US side, and the Russians would probably like to see it neutralized.

Indeed, the scenario of an Israeli strike setting back Iran’s nuclear program by a decade or so, followed by an Iranian-Syrian-Palestinian war which Israel loses would probably be just fine with the Russians.

What a pity for the folks who gave us the word ‘pogrom‘ if Israel were to destroy the Iranian nuclear program, and then turn around and deal a crushing blow to Mr. Assad and his missile collection.

Or maybe it will happen in the reverse order?

Technorati Tags: Syria, Russia, Israel, Iran, SA-22, Pantsyr

On Thursday I wrote as follows about the response of the ADL to an article critical of its position against legislation to recognize the Armenian Genocide, specifically a letter signed by Andrew H. Tarsy, then Regional Director in New England:

…the argument that efforts to force the Turks to accept the truth will be ‘counterproductive’, that one is somehow preventing them from “coming to grips with their past” by supporting such resolutions — please. This argument is disingenuous, and is enough to make me blush on behalf of Tarsy and the ADL.

Apparently Mr. Tarsy himself, who is now out of a job, agrees with me.

Tarsy, 38, said he had been struggling with the national position for weeks and finally told Foxman in a phone conversation Thursday that he found the ADL’s stance “morally indefensible.”

…”I regret at this point any characterization of the genocide that I made publicly other than to call it a genocide. I think that kind of candor about history is absolutely fundamental.”

As recently as Tuesday night, however, Tarsy defended the ADL’s position before a hostile crowd at the Watertown Town Council meeting. In explaining why he did it, Tarsy said yesterday that he was doing the best he could to explain the ADL policy while struggling at the same time to change the policy internally. Neither side would back down and he was fired. — Boston Globe

The ADL’s position is not only “morally indefensible” as Tarsy has said, but is unlikely to have any effect on the Turkish government’s policy toward Israel, or Turkish Jews.

Ironically, the result of the ADL’s stubbornness on this issue has been to seriously weaken the respect in which the ADL is held in the broader Jewish and non-Jewish community, and to diminish its effectiveness in anti-bias activism.

Kol hakovod to Mr. Tarsy, who took the moral high road that his boss would not.

Technorati Tags: Tarsy, ADL, Armenian Genocide

Question: What is the difference between US support for the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and support for Hamas?

Answer: not much. Consider the recent ‘accidental’ payment of a full year’s salary to 3,500 members of the Hamas ‘security’ forces by the PA:

In defending his move, [PA Prime Minister Salam] Fayad initially claimed that the payment was a regrettable error caused by a computer glitch. In his updated story, Fayad claimed that a Hamas agent in his Ministry of Finance was responsible for the move.

Fayad’s excuses naturally raise the question: If Fatah opposes Hamas, why are all the names and bank account numbers of Hamas’s soldiers conveniently located in Fatah’s Ministry of Finance’s computer files? Aside from that, it is hard to believe that Fayad objected to paying the jihad forces. Since Hamas took over Gaza in June, Fayad has regularly paid the salaries of Hamas legislators, civil servants in Hamas’s government, and Hamas terrorists imprisoned in Israeli jails.

Moreover, Fayad’s assertions that Fatah opposes Hamas are hardly believable given that Fatah is engaged in intense negotiations with Hamas toward a reunification of their forces. Wednesday, PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas stated openly that he seeks to reconcile with Hamas. In his joint press briefing with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Abbas called for a “return to national unity.” He said, “The split [between Judea and Samaria and Gaza which happened] as a result of Hamas’s coup is temporary and will be removed.” — Caroline Glick

Since the Palestinians have no economy and no resources, this payment came from money transferred to the PA by the US or European Union. Our good, Western, anti-terrorist dollars and Euros.

It seems as though the US and the Olmert government are rushing headlong toward the creation of some kind, any kind, of a Palestinian state under Abbas (anything is acceptable, just as long as it’s not Hamas). On the Israeli side, I don’t know how much of the support for this is genuine or is a result of pressure from the US. US policy is apparently being dictated by the so-called ‘realists’ connected to the Bush Administration, such as James Baker, and the US State Department.

I’m going to make a prediction that this will not come to fruition. I wish that the reason were that Israel and the US would decide that making deals with Fatah is unproductive and dangerous, but unfortunately that will not happen. The change in policy will be the result of something much worse.

I think it’s likely that war will break out between Israel and Iranian proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas, and possibly Syria) within the next year. This will be accompanied by renewed terrorism from the West Bank, and it will become clear to everyone that Israel’s security requires a military presence there.

If peace is the goal, then I recommend that Israel stop pretending that enemies can be friends but rather build up a strong deterrent capability to keep them at bay.

Technorati Tags: Israel, Fatah, Hamas, Fayad

Israel and the US are making a big mistake by placing trust in Mahmoud Abbas.

Speaking to reporters after a meeting in Ramallah with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Abbas – for the first time since Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June – seemed to soften his stance toward the Islamist movement, calling on it to “return to national unity.” Abbas’s remarks were interpreted by Palestinians as an appeal to Hamas to resume talks with his Fatah faction.

Hamas immediately welcomed Abbas’s statements and invited him to talk to the movement’s leaders in the Gaza Strip.

“The split that happened [between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip] as a result of Hamas’s coup is temporary and will be removed,” Abbas said. “The Palestinian people are opposed to this separation because we want a united and independent Palestinian state.”

As I’ve written almost ad nauseum, if Hamas and Fatah join in a unity government, then all of the resources — money, arms, and legitimacy — that the West has showered on Abbas fall into the hands of the rejectionist, terrorist Hamas.

This despite the fact that the “renewed peace process” with Fatah has absolutely zero chance of success.

There are supposed to be political benefits to Israel simply from being in such a process. It’s generally believed that it wouldn’t do for Israel to appear to reject any opportunity for a peace agreement, no matter how far-fetched. However, the concrete practical consequences of this present process, which involves military aid to the Palestinians, are dangerous for Israel’s security.

I would argue that the supposed advantages from the negotiations are far overblown. There is supposed to be a propaganda point made — that Israel is always seeking peace. But by entering into a process which can only result in unacceptable demands being made on Israel, such as negotiations based on the Arab League Initiative, Israel leaves herself open to charges of intransigence and bad faith when she rejects these demands as she must.

Another problem is that Israel’s enemies continue to understand any willingness to compromise or make concessions as either a show of weakness or a diabolical trick.

My suggestion is that Israel should make a bottom-line statement something like this: we are willing to negotiate with anyone who will begin by agreeing that Israel is a legitimate state with a right to exist, and who will abjure terrorism or war against Israel.

This may seem like not such a big deal to the average westerner, but most Palestinians and Arabs believe that Israel is not legitimate, that its right to exist is entirely contingent on the decision of the true ‘owners’ of the land, and that therefore they have a right to ‘resistance’.

But a ‘peace process’ based on less than this must in the end be detrimental to the cause of peace.

Technorati Tags: Israel, Palestinians, Hamas, Fatah