OK, it’s not from the regular media, it’s from the Little Green Footballs blog. But it’s still one of the best headlines ever:
Lebanon Kills Hundreds, Destroys Camp, World Yawns
OK, it’s not from the regular media, it’s from the Little Green Footballs blog. But it’s still one of the best headlines ever:
Lebanon Kills Hundreds, Destroys Camp, World Yawns
Today was the first day of school in Sderot. Seven Qassam rockets fell in the town in the morning. No one was hurt, but one landed close to a day care center, damaging a building. Qassams have been fired at Israelis since 2001; sometimes only one or two a day, sometimes hundreds within a few days.
Last week three Palestinian children were killed when they played tag around some Qassam launchers. IDF gunners did not see that they were children until a missile had already been fired at them.
So Hamas is trying hard to kill Israeli children, but only succeeded in killing Palestinian ones this time.
On their website, Hamas’ Ezzedeen al-Qassam brigades (the rocket and organization are named after the same “martyr”) claim that they are responding to “Zionist crimes” in attacking “settlers” in Sderot, which has been part of Israel since 1948.
Why is Hamas firing rockets at Sderot? Their reasoning is like this: If Israel continues to do nothing, Israelis will be shown to be weaklings that can’t defend their land. Ultimately the citizens of Sderot will give up and leave. This will be good for Hamas.
On the other hand, if Israel is provoked into a massive attack of Gaza (where Hamas has built serious defensive positions) there will be a large number of Israeli military casualties (good for Hamas) as well as opportunities to display Palestinian civilian casualties to the world (also good for Hamas). This also might trigger bombardment of Israeli towns in the north by Hezbollah.
But, as everyone says, “this can’t be allowed to continue”. And ultimately Israel will be fighting Hamas. It won’t go away and won’t become ‘moderate’.
So maybe get it over with, the sooner the better.
Lebanon was supposed to be an example of cooperation between Muslims, Christians, Druze, etc. It hasn’t worked out that way, mostly because of interference from outside parties, such as the then-Soviet backed PLO in the ’70’s, and of course Syria. Barry Rubin discusses the present situation, precarious for the Lebanese and for Israel, and a bad omen for the struggle against radical Islamism.
The Battle for Lebanon
by Barry Rubin
Lebanon may be beginning one of the most turbulent periods in its all-too-tumultuous history. As the world looks on with apparent indifference, Islamist and Iran-led forces may be on the verge of a new victory over Arab nationalists and just about everyone else.
With what can only be called astounding courage, most Lebanese Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim politicians have stood up to the Shia Muslim group Hizballah as well as its Iranian and Syrian backers. Hizballah is well-financed from Tehran and Damascus; the government–and even less its constituent elements–receive relatively little international help.
Arms pour across the border to Hizballah, as a UN-dispatched force supposed to help stop this flow stands by inactive. True, there is some foreign aid to Lebanon’s armed forces, but that army is led by a man, Michael Suleiman, who might be the Syrian-Iranian candidate for president, and many of its soldiers are pro-Hizballah, too.
The Syrians buy some politicians, like the former Christian patriot Michel Aoun, and kill others who resist, as happened to former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. The UN has sponsored an investigation into Hariri’s killing that points to high-level Syrian involvement. But after two years of inquiry there is no end in sight and many Western politicians along with several governments are eager to “engage” Syria in dialogue.
Thus, the Syrians have engaged in systematic terrorism in Lebanon and pretty much gotten away with it so far. When a Syrian-backed Palestinian Islamist group, Fatah al-Islam, raised a revolt against the Lebanese government, the world was sympathetic to Lebanon but was largely content to blame it on shadowy al-Qaida forces acting independently. The same happened regarding terror attacks on the UN forces in Lebanon. Meanwhile, of course, no Hizballah or pro-Syrian politician has been assaulted by the moderates.
But even all this is not the most fitting symbol of the “international community’s” dereliction of duty in Lebanon. Here’s what is:
If you stand near the Israel-Lebanon border you will see the blue flag of the UN flying in Lebanese territory. Nearby flutters Hizballah’s yellow flag. A number of people have remarked on this fact, yet none seem to have drawn the logical conclusion from it.
During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah, most countries — held back for some days by the United States — eagerly demanded that there be a ceasefire. Finally, they got their way. The ceasefire drawn up at the UN mandated a large international armed force in southern Lebanon. Its mission was to keep Hizballah out of the area, ensure control by Lebanon’s government, if possible assist in the disarming of Hizballah by government forces, help stop arms smuggling, and prevent fighting between the two countries that share the border.
It has failed in all these tasks but the last one, and on even that point who knows how long will that be sustained. What is remarkable here is not just the failure itself but the fact that the world does not seem to be particularly agitated about it. Delegations are still asking the Syrians, pretty please, if they might act to stop the arms’ smuggling they are carrying out. And this is so even when Hizballah flaunts its triumph by sticking its flag right in the UN’s face.
So here’s what those two flags mean: almost 200 countries for once went up against Iran and its allies and guess who won? What does this mean for Western credibility? Will it encourage more moderation or more aggression from the radical Islamist side? The answer, unlike those flags, is not blowing in the wind. Being willing to kill people and cause trouble is a weapon so powerful for Hizballah and its friends that the West quails in fear.
Now begins the next round of the Lebanese battle: the election of president which begins September 25. The ostensible Syrian-Iranian candidate is Aoun, whose ambition to become president, or at least mistaken hope he can outmaneuver his allies, has blinded him to the consequences of his dangerous bargain. A possible alternative would be Suleiman, who is already being presented by the Syrians as a “compromise” choice to gullible Europeans. The government side will soon have to present its candidate.
If the two sides fail to reach agreement Lebanon could soon have two governments and perhaps even one civil war. Or it could have a regime dominated by Hizballah, Iran, and Syria. Why should Lebanese moderates fight a hopeless battle? How many hundreds of thousands would leave the country? How long would it be before a radical regime in Beirut brought on another war with Israel?
And what about the consequences elsewhere? Wouldn’t Hizballah’s triumph inspire a vast increase in radical Islamist forces in every Arab country and a total victory for Hamas–also backed by Tehran and Damascus–over Fatah in the Palestinian civil war? If Syria concludes it can violently strike at Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel with no costs won’t this increase its aggressiveness? How about Iran, whose claims that the West is weak and in retreat would be thus confirmed?
Those aware of history should be reminded of something by events in Lebanon. In 1936, at an early stage of a different international conflict, a fascist uprising in Spain took place against the elected government there. Western democracies and the League of Nations (the equivalent of the UN today) stayed neutral as Germany and Italy poured in help to the rebels. After three years, the Spanish republic was defeated and dictators in Berlin and Rome took note. The battle that European democrats tried to forestall by passivity was made all the more inevitable.
Today, Lebanon is the main battlefront involving radical Islamist forces and Iranian ambitions, proof that terrorism works and Western determination doesn’t. As such, it is the epicenter of today’s most vital issue. Attention–and a lot more than that–must be paid.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs, and author of the recently published The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).
The teenage daughter of a friend of mine recently returned from a 6-week trip to Israel. She went with a group of American and Israeli Jewish kids, of various backgrounds — secular, liberal, and orthodox. They traveled all over the country and met all kinds of people, including settlers, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians.
Someone asked her “if there is one thing that you learned on this trip that you would like to tell us about, what was it?”
She said something like this: “Beforehand, I thought that all we had to do to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was to get the two sides to understand each other’s point of view. Now I see that it’s much harder than that — it goes very, very deep”.
Indeed. This young woman has been active in interfaith activities. I’m sure that the emphasis was on understanding, listening to the other side’s point of view, and getting to know each other as individuals, not as stereotypes.
And probably what she heard was that if it were possible to prevent “a few extremists on both sides” from stirring up hatred and violence, the conflict could be solved by reasonable people talking, listening, and compromising.
But, as she found out, it’s not that easy. There are several kinds of basic disagreements between Israelis and Palestinians that can’t be settled this way. Here are just a few of many that inform the conflict:
And the most difficult kind of disagreement of all,
None of this is easy, and it is all connected, with the historical narratives serving as justification for today’s ideology. And there is one whole additional dimension of the conflict, which actually has little to do with Israelis and Palestinians:
Technorati Tags: Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Today Dr. Alfred Evans, CSUF Professor of Political Science, had a piece in the Fresno Bee called “More misconceptions about terrorism“. One of them was described thus:
A sixth misconception is that the actions of terrorist organizations that target the U.S. are motivated directly and primarily by their hostility to our values. Some have said that terrorists attack us because they hate our freedom.
That explanation is rejected by the consensus of experts on anti-American terrorism. The late Gen. Wayne Downing of the U.S. Army (who served as Commander of Special Operations and later as the president’s chief adviser on terrorism) summarized the results of opinion surveys in several Middle Eastern countries by saying, “It is U.S. regional policies — not a clash of values, religion or the ‘Al Jazeera factor’ — that influence anti-American attitudes in the Middle East.” The Defense Science Board report of November 2004 underlined the same point.
Michael Scheuer, who formerly headed the unit in the CIA that tracked Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida and whose books have been praised highly by experts on terrorism, says flatly that none of the reasons for which bin Laden is waging war on us “have anything to do with our freedom, liberty and democracy, but have everything to do with U.S. policies and actions in the Muslim world.”
But the ‘experts’ and Evans are missing an important point. The terrorists of al-Qaeda, have a radical Islamist philosophy. What does this mean and what does it imply?