Ahmadinejad

October 1st, 2007

Mahmoud AhmadinejadEverybody wants to know if Ahmadinejad is only posturing or if he is really dangerous. Barry Rubin argues that he is indeed a threat to Western civilization and that ‘engagement’ is not the way to deal with him.

In Search of Ahmadinejad

By Barry Rubin

A massive controversy has erupted in the United States, and across the world, around Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to New York, where he spoke at the United Nations and Columbia University.

Who is this man and what does he want? Is he a new Hitler or a leader with understandable grievances who should be engaged in dialogue? Apart from the passion provoked and naïveté too often shown toward this leader, how can we accurately assess him?

Ahmadinejad is a demagogue on a lot of issues for three distinct reasons:

First, he is trying to use his radical stance—extremist even on the already extreme Iranian political spectrum—to gain control of the country. As head of a faction and due to personal ambition he is trying to displace other groups. Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei remains the single most powerful person in Iran and Ahmadinejad’s real rival within the country.

Second, Ahmadinejad is pursuing the Iranian Islamist revolution’s long-term goal—but one not always given top priority by the regime—of spreading Islamist revolution throughout the region and emerging as the most powerful force in the Middle East. In terms of promoting Iran’s primacy, there is an inherent nationalist as well as Islamist element in his policy.

Third, Ahmadinejad seems to be a true believer in the Iranian Islamist ideology which sees international politics as a struggle between the true followers of the deity and the allies of Satan.

Ahmadinejad’s goals, then, are his control over Iran, Iran’s control over the Persian Gulf area (especially Iraq), Israel’s destruction, Iranian leadership over the Middle East, the expulsion of Western (and especially American) influence from the region, and even world domination, in roughly that order.

Basically, Ahmadinejad is not a unique phenomenon in modern Middle East history. The role to be filled is that of the leader of the Arabs and Muslims as well as prime enemy of America, Israel, and the West. In this respect, he is comparable to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s; Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1970s and 1980s; Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and 1990s; and Usama bin Ladin during the period before and especially after September 11, 2001. Yet Ahmadinejad has also become a symbol for the radical Islamist challenge to everyone else in the world

What makes Ahmadinejad different? The key element here, and one due to his own words and behavior, is that he seems not to be held back by caution, a rational calculation of the balance of forces, even if judged by the standard of his predecessors aside from bin Ladin of course. In other words, Ahmadinejad seems capable of anything and consequently far more dangerous. This conclusion is not just a matter of Western projection. I’ll bet that at times he scares even Khamenei.

Here are some elements in that set of problems:

  • Ahmadinejad makes statements implying his belief that the end of the world is at hand and the Shia messiah is on the way. Thus, provoking war with Israel or the United States is not so much to be seen as risking the destruction of Iran’s Islamist regime as fulfilling its divine mission.
  • For a number of reasons, Ahmadinejad thinks that his side is winning and the West is weak and in retreat. That could provoke him to even more extreme adventurism.
  • While other Iranian leaders have spoken about Israel’s destruction, he is putting it higher on his agenda and is more likely to do something to try to implement this objective.
  • The way things are going he will one day have nuclear weapons to play with in fulfilling his goals. Two important points should be noted here. First, the bombs and missiles would be held by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, his close ally and the main liaison between Iran and terrorist groups, itself raising the prospect of their being used. Second, even if Iran never used nuclear weapons the effect on the region would be devastating. Arab governments would rush to appease Iran; large numbers of Arabs would rush to join radical Islamist groups believing that this movement is the wave of the future.
  • In Iraq, Iran has gone into a virtual state of war against the United States trying to project Tehran’s influence and killing American soldiers.
  • Ahmadinejad has also become, for all practical purposes, the leader in promoting hatred of the United States and not only of Israel but of Jews in general.

What undercuts the dangers posed by Ahmadinejad? He still does not have full control over Iran and may never achieve this goal. Since he is a Shia Muslim and is not an Arab it is more difficult for him to play a leadership role over the largely Sunni Muslim Arabic-speaking world. Not impossible, as these barriers have been partly overcome, but harder nonetheless.

Thus, Ahmadinejad has not yet achieved the status of being equivalent to Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin as the world’s leading threat to peace and freedom but he is certainly trying to rise to this level.

It should be rather obvious that this is not a problem caused by lack of communication and that engagement with him will not have any moderating effect. He must be opposed and his regime pressured. Aside from the problems posed by the Iranian government in general, taking a tough stand against Ahmadinejad is necessary to convince his colleague-rivals that they must get rid of this guy and tone down their country’s behavior in order to ensure their own survival and that of their regime.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA). His latest books are The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan) and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley).

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A far too-clever formulation

September 30th, 2007

From time to time we see the argument made that a reasonable compromise on the Palestinian ‘right of return’ would be for Israel to accept the ‘right’ of the Palestinians to return, without it being ‘realized’:

We, the Jews, also do not surrender, nor can we surrender, our rights to the historic holdings of our forefathers in Hebron, Shilo, and Anatot. But the majority of Israelis are willing to relinquish the right to realize Jewish sovereignty and Jewish settlement at those Biblical sites, in proportion to Palestinian concessions. The vast majority of Palestinians are clearly aware that it is impossible for millions of refugees to return to their homes and land in Jaffa, Ramle, and Haifa.

Everyone knows that this is Israel’s red line. In an endless number of deliberations of a solution to the refugee problem and proposed solutions, a formula was suggested which would divide the “right of return” into two terms: “Right” and “return.” The right exists; it is not subject to appeal, nor is the somewhat problematic wording of UN Resolution 194, which recognizes that right, subject to appeal. But practical return to the geographic domain of the State of Israel is not feasible. Danny Rubinstein in Ha’aretz

There are several things wrong with this far too-clever formulation. For one, it is irrational to tell someone that he has a right to something, but in the same breath that he is forbidden from realizing it. What is the meaning of ‘right’ in this case?

Here in the United States there was a situation for many years in which blacks had the ‘right’ to vote, but were forbidden from exercising this right. People struggled and even gave their lives so that these rights could be realized, and ultimately they were.

Another problem is that granting this ‘right’, whether or not it is realized, implies that the Palestinian narrative that the land of Israel belongs to them, not to the present residents, is true. Is constitutes an admission that Jews do not have the ‘right’ to live there. Are we prepared to say “we are thieves, but the true owners are forbidden to take back their property?” Do we believe this?

And from a practical point of view: once we agree that they have a right to return, what argument do we use to prevent them from returning? “It would destroy the Jewish character of the state” might be meaningful to us, but who else would accept it? And why should they?

Indeed, this ‘compromise’ is not a compromise, it is a complete surrender in principle with the proviso that the physical surrender will take place at some later date.

Although Danny Rubinstein — who called Israel an ‘apartheid state’ at a UN conference in Brussels — is a particularly loose cannon, this idea has appeared in other circles as well.

It is to be hoped that Israeli leaders do not adopt this as a way to deal with Palestinian demands for a right of return at the November peace conference. They should make it quite clear that Jews live in Israel with full legitimacy and ownership of the land that they live on, and that there is no Palestinian ‘right of return’, realizable or otherwise.

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Are we really as stupid as we seem?

September 30th, 2007

Khaled Abu Toameh reports:

Fatah will fight alongside Hamas if and when the IDF launches a military operation in the Gaza Strip, a senior Fatah official in Gaza City said Thursday.

“Fatah won’t remain idle in the face of an Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip,” the official said. “We will definitely fight together with Hamas against the Israeli army. It’s our duty to defend our people against the occupiers.”

The Fatah official said his faction would place political differences aside and form a joint front against Israel if the IDF enters the Gaza Strip. “The homeland is more important than all our differences,” he said…

According to…reports, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have decided to invite representatives of Fatah and Hamas for talks on ways of ending their power struggle.

Big surprise.

Russian APCMeanwhile, the German Foreign Minister suggests that Europe should send aid to Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah faction, the Israeli government [!] has approved sending Russian armored personnel carriers, rifles and ammunation to Abbas, and Israel plans to release 400 Fatah security prisoners this Sunday.

No, Israel has not said that they will teach them to drive the APCs. That will probably be the job of US Generals James Jones and Keith Dayton, whose job is to ‘coordinate security’ and build up the Fatah faction’s ability to ‘fight terror’.

Last week, terrorists of Fatah’s al-Aqsa brigades murdered Israeli Ido Zoltan. Not Hamas. Fatah.

So they don’t agree to recognize Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, they plan to cooperate with Hamas — although they have supposedly agreed with the ‘roadmap’ that they will disarm and dismantle terrorist groups — and they can’t or won’t control their own terrorists. Partner…or enemy?

It should be 100% clear by now, to the US, Europe, and Israel, that Fatah’s moderation is only wishful thinking, and the strategy of building a solution to the conflict on it cannot possibly succeed. Arms supplied to Fatah will be used directly against Israel, as they were in the Oslo period, or they will end up in the hands of Hamas as they did earlier this year. How many times do we need to make the same mistake?

Are we really as stupid as we seem?

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Peace vs. ‘peace’

September 29th, 2007

I got called “anti-Peace” again recently. But I am not anti-Peace, I very much wish for Peace between Israel and the Arabs so that my children who live in Israel can be safe, so that my son, who has been some form of soldier for the past ten years, can be an artist as he wishes to be.

But what I am is anti-‘peace’. What’s the difference?

A necessary condition for Peace is that the Arabs have stopped trying to kill Jews and destroy Israel. A 10-year hudna, such as Hamas offers, for example, is not Peace because it is only a particular tactic in the struggle; the goal remains the same. Peace is more or less what Israel has with Jordan today.

And what is ‘peace’? ‘Peace’ is a situation in which Israel and the Arabs have signed an agreement which states that both sides want Peace and spells out what they will do to get it, but which is either impossible to implement or which one or both sides intends to circumvent. The Oslo Accord is a good example of ‘peace’. Papers were signed, concessions were made, but Yasser Arafat never wanted Peace, never held up his end of the agreements, and ultimately made war.

Some Israelis said from the beginning that Oslo was only ‘peace’, but most thought it would lead to Peace and were bitterly disappointed.

Most ordinary people, Israelis and Palestinians, probably want Peace, although some other things that they want are incompatible. But who wants ‘peace’?

The US wants ‘peace’. The Bush Administration wants it because an agreement will make them look good in history and because they think that they can get Syria to stop supporting Iraqi insurgents by forcing Israel to give them the Golan Heights. The US State Department wants ‘peace’ because it is basically pro-Arab and knows that ‘peace’ will weaken Israel and make the Saudis happy.

Mahmoud Abbas wants ‘peace’, because it will mean more aid from the US and Europe for him, and because it will weaken Israel and serve as a stage on the way to replacing Israel with an Arab state.

Hamas and Syria want neither Peace nor ‘peace’. They do not want to help Abbas or the US. Hamas’ constituency will not accept even ‘peace’. Syria does not want ‘peace’, because ‘peace’ would (as Barry Rubin argues in The Truth About Syria) remove the excuse used by the Assad regime to oppress its population, drain the economy, and exploit Lebanon. Assad would much prefer the status quo without the Golan Heights to an agreement that would make him give up his influence in Lebanon.

The Israeli government is in an interesting position. Although Oslo taught them the difference between Peace and ‘peace’, ‘peace’ is very important to the Americans who are important to Israel. The international media, the UN and NGOs, the EU, Tony Blair, etc. — they all seem to think (or pretend) that ‘peace’ is Peace.

So the PM and the Foreign Minister need to pretend that they think ‘peace’ is Peace and are enthusiastic about it — otherwise they will be called “anti-Peace”.

It’s not a problem for me.

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Misplaced optimism

September 28th, 2007

Palestinian Authority (West Bank branch) President Mahmoud Abbas is optimistic:

Israel and the Palestinians may sign a peace agreement within six months of the international Mideast peace conference scheduled for November, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas said on Friday. — Jerusalem Post

Leaving aside the question of the more than 1 million Palestinians who live in Hamas-run Gaza, what has changed since 2000 to make this possible?

Has Israel’s attitude changed toward the Palestinian demand, not softened by Abbas, to resettle the descendants of Palestinian refugees in Israel?

Have the Palestinians indicated that they would be prepared to accept any less of Jerusalem than all of the areas formerly occupied by Jordan? Will they allow Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount?

Have the Saudis, billed as the stars of the upcoming conference, given us any reason to believe that the Arab League proposal on which this conference is supposedly based will offer Israel anything other than terms of surrender?

Does Syria, which the US wishes to invite to the conference, have any more desire to end the conflict with Israel than in the past (see Barry Rubin’s opinion here)?

No, there is only one thing that is driving this conference, and that is the US desire to gain concessions from Syria and help from Saudi Arabia in respect to Iraq. The polite way to put it is the way it appeared in the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group report:

Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism—are inextricably linked…

The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and particularly Syria—which is the principal transit point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and which supports radical Palestinian groups.

I’ve argued that this ‘linkage’ idea is nonsense. Unfortunately, the US State Department doesn’t agree with me, and so is moving ahead with its plan to trade its only reliable ally in the Mideast for probably worthless promises from the Arab nations.

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